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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERA MORGAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DR. WALLACE J. MORGAN, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the lower court err in assessing the defendant 
husband in this case with expenses incurred by his wife for 
attorneys and other professionals needed by her to prosecute an 
action for divorce? 
2. Did the lower court err in valuing the bank accounts 
of the parties? 
3. Did the lower court err in awarding alimony to the 
plaintiff wife under the circumstances of this case? 
4. In dividing the property did the lower court properly 
consider probable tax consequences accruing to the parties? 
5. Did the lower court err in failing to apply a minority 
discount in valuing various assets owned by the parties? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Vera Morgan accepts the statement of the case made 
in Appellant's Brief as essentially accurate and complete. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3). 
Case No. 88-414-CA 
Priority No. 14B 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The "Statement of Facts" contained in Appellant's Brief is 
basically an abbreviated argument of the legal issues subsequently 
raised* Respondent takes exception to these "facts" which are 
essentially a preliminary argument of the position taken by the 
defendant. Many of the statements contained in Appellant's Brief 
mischaracterize the evidence and editorialize the actions of the 
lower court. 
Insofar as the Statement of Facts actually describes events 
of the marriage or property of the marriage which was subject to 
division Respondent does not disagree. (Appellant's Statement of 
Facts, pp. 3-10). Respondent Vera Morgan, however, believes that 
the decision of the lower court as contained in a minute entry of 
April 13, 1988 with the attached division of marital property 
prepared by the lower court (Exhibit A to Appellant's Brief); the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the Court 
(Exhibit D to Appellant's Brief); and the Decree of Divorce 
entered by the lower court (Exhibit E to Appellant's Brief) 
explain in detail the decision of the lower court as to the 
property and other issues now in contention. 
There is no question but that the marriage of these parties 
involved substantial assets. The lower court concluded that the 
marital property had a fair market value of over $3,600,000. (See 
Minute Entry, April 13, 1988 "Division of Marital Property" 
hereinafter referred to as "Court Division of Marital Property"). 
The plaintiff placed a value on the property of over $3,800,000. 
(Proposed Division of Marital Property of Plaintiff, Exhibit 56, 
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contained in Exhibt I of Appellant's Brief)- The defendant Dr. 
Wallace Morgan evaluated the property at slightly over $3 million. 
(See Exhibit H to Appellant's Brief). 
While there is some difference in the valuation of the 
property by the parties the real difference in this case resulted 
in the determination of the net assets available for division 
after various liabilities and proposed adjustments were deducted. 
For example, Plaintiff concluded that there was a net of over 
$2,225,000 in divisible property and of that amount some 
$1,200,000 should be awarded to the plaintiff with a little over 
$1,000,000 awarded to the defendant. (See Exhibit I to 
Appellant's Brief). On the other hand, the defendant contended 
that after the various debits and adjustments were made that there 
was less than $1,000,000 available for distribution in assets with 
defendant proposing that the plaintiff receive $571,000 in assets 
and that he receive $414,000 in assets. (See Exhibit H to 
Appellant's Brief). The lower court concluded that the marital 
property had a net value of over $1,790,000 and awarded some 
$906,000 to Plaintiff and some $886,000 to Defendant. (See Court 
Division of Marital Property contained in Exhibit D to Appellant's 
Brief). 
Fortunately for purposes of this appeal a large number of 
items that were divided by the lower court are not contested by 
the parties. Rather, Defendant has focused upon several 
valuations and divisions which he believes to be unjust. Because 
of this limited focus it would serve no useful purpose to discuss 
in detail all of the evidence that was produced by both parties 
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concerning the marriage and its many assets and liabilities. 
Instead, Respondent believes it is much more efficient and 
expeditious to reserve a factual discussion of the events and 
assets to each section of the brief in which such facts apply. 
Thus, only relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
legal issues now raised by Appellant will be discussed in this 
Brief. 
Before proceeding to the legal analysis, however, two 
observations should be made. First, it is apparent from reviewing 
the transcript in this trial together with the post-trial motions 
that the lower court was essentially having to give and take as to 
both parties. It is apparent that the lower court did not give 
either party the exact distribution of assets and liabilities they 
desired. Rather, the court made a series of compromises based 
upon what the court believed was in the best interest of both 
parties. 
Plaintiff Vera Morgan believes that the court's distribution, 
while not entirely satisfactory to her, is nevertheless fair 
viewed in the total circumstances confronting the lower court. 
If, however, this Court should for any reason now argued by the 
appellant find that the lower court erred in the award of an asset 
or the requirement of an obligation then Respondent asserts that 
the entire matter should be remanded in order to allow the lower 
court to redistribute the assets and liabilities based upon any 
new distribution requirement. 
In other words, it is essential that this case not be viewed 
in a vacuum and that this Court realize that any major change in 
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the present decree could result in a drastic misdistribution of 
property unless further adjustments were permitted- If, for 
example, an award to the plaintiff of $50,000 is found to be 
incorrect then essentially the defendant would receive a net gain 
of $100,000 if no adjustment were made since he would have 
previously received a corresponding $50,000 asset to offset the 
asset awarded to the plaintiff. In such a case, therefore, rather 
than promoting equity of the parties, a reversal of the lower 
court without further adjustment would create gross inequity* 
A second observation is also in order. It is apparent from 
reviewing the evidence in this case that the credibility of the 
parties was an essential element in the court's determination that 
the distribution urged by the plaintiff was more in line with the 
economic realities of the parties* It is axiomatic that the lower 
court is given a great deal of discretion in evaluating the 
demeanor of the witnesses as they testify in the lower court. 
Conversely, this Court has no ability to judge their credibility 
and is essentially left with the cold, hard record established 
below* 
Respondent would suggest that the credibility of Appellant as 
to his valuation of the assets and other matters was highly 
suspicious in light of several circumstances which appeared at 
trial. First, Plaintiff produced a number of documents, many of 
them certified bank questionnaires, which were prepared by Dr. 
Morgan prior to the divorce proceeding being filed in which he 
listed his assets as substantially higher than that which he 
listed for purposes of trial. (Tr. 17-25; Exhibits 41, 42, 43, 
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and 49). He characterized these prior statements as "gross 
exaggerations" of his real net worth and as "false summaries" of 
his assets. These bank applications were viewed by the court in 
comparison with that prepared by Dr. Morgan for the purpose of the 
trial in which his assets were considerably reduced from the prior 
statements. (Tr. 27, Exhibit 45). The lower court, therefore, 
was certainly free to believe that the prior documents made by Dr. 
Morgan were the more correct accounting of his true assets and 
liabilities. 
Second, Mrs. Morgan testified that her husband frequently 
used cash in order to avoid any "trail" of expenditures and 
assets. In addition, he spent large sums of money gambling in 
various ways including horse racing and cards. (Tr. 198-202). 
Dr. Morgan's gambling expenditures were verified by his 
stockbroker and social friend Jerrold Jenson. (Tr. 260-263). 
Thus, the court had ample evidence to believe that there were 
assets beyond those listed by the defendant. 
Third, the credibility of Dr. Morgan was further impeached 
with the testimony of Shaunna Wixom, a paralegal for the attorneys 
of Mrs. Morgan, who testified that in a document search she 
accidently discovered a banking account which contained $60,000 
which had not been reported by Dr. Morgan in previous requests for 
documents. In addition, three other financial statements were 
obtained by various means of discovery which had not been 
specifically listed by Dr. Morgan in his documentation. (Tr. 
359-69). 
These, and other instances, impeach the credibility of Dr. 
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Morgan as to the truthfulness of his testimony. The lower court 
was therefore justified in believing the evidence of distribution 
presented by the plaintiff based upon this credibility issue 
alone. That, together with the voluminous documentation and 
expert testimony offered by Plaintiff, clearly substantiated the 
lower court's division of property and provided a fair and 
equitable division for both parties based upon their individual 
abilities and circumstances. 
As noted earlier, additional facts will be presented as 
required. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The court did not charge expenses such as accounting and 
appraisal fees as "costs" but merely considered these expenses as 
part of the overall debt of the parties. Since both sides 
admitted that these fees would have to be paid it was not 
erroneous for the lower court to take them into consideration in 
dividing the assets and liabilities. 
Likewise, the lower court correctly found the attorneysffees 
incurred by the plaintiff to be a liability which had to be dealt 
with in the division of property. The attorneys' fees were 
reasonable in light of the experience of the attorneys and staff 
involved in this case and in light of the extraordinary effort 
that was required because of Dr. Morgan's evasive conduct. There 
was, therefore, no abuse of discretion in the awarding of expenses 
or attorneys' fees. 
2. The lower court correctly valued the bank accounts of the 
parties as of the most current statement presented at trial. 
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Defendant failed to produce any competent evidence as to the 
correct balances of these accounts as of the date of trial and the 
best evidence of the amounts in the accounts was the bank 
statements themselves introduced by the plaintiff. Defendant Dr. 
Morgan made no effort to show that these statements were incorrect 
in light of expenditures or to explain what expenditures in fact 
had been made. Thus, the court based its decision upon the most 
credible evidence available to it. 
3. The lower court correctly awarded Plaintiff alimony in 
light of the circumstances of this marriage. Although Plaintiff 
is unable to be gainfully employed she is still entitled to 
maintain the standard of living which she enjoyed during her 
marriage. Defendant has a lucrative dental practice as well as 
the ability to enter into investments and other types of 
businesses. Defendant was left with sufficient assets for him to 
not only cover the expenses assessed against him but also to 
provide alimony for his wife of some 39 years. In addition, since 
Mrs. Morgan is still obligated to pay one-half of the $4,000 plus 
monthly mortgage on the family residence this additional money is 
required to meet that obligation together with the increased 
expense of renting a residence now that she is no longer allowed 
to live in the family residence. 
4. The lower court did not err in failing to apply a rule of 
tax consequences to the assets of this marriage. As to the PSI 
Ltd. asset Dr. Morgan applied the proceeds of this sale to pay 
down a line of credit for his own dental practice. Mrs. Morgan 
received no benefit from this payment and therefore was entitled 
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to a credit for half of the gain received. In addition, there was 
no showing at the trial that Defendant would necessarily have to 
incur any tax liability because of the award of the court in that 
Defendant had a substantial income which he could use to pay 
current expenses and, in addition, had substantial assets which he 
could use as collateral for a bank loan to meet any additional 
obligations he had incurred. 
5. The lower court did not err in valuating the partnership 
interests of Dr. Morgan. Dr. Morgan was an equal partner in the 
operation of these partnerships and the agreements provided a 
means in which a buyout would occur with no loss to Dr. Morgan. 
In addition, there was no showing that a liquidation of these 
assets would have to occur because of this divorce and it would 
have been error for the lower court to apply a discount thereby 
penalizing Plaintiff by undervaluing the total assets. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS 
DIVISION OF EXPENSES AND ATTORNEYS1 FEES 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Defendant makes two arguments in his brief concerning 
expenses and attorneys1 fees. First, he claims that the lower 
court incorrectly required him to pay certain fees incurred by 
Plaintiff for appraisals, accountings and incidental legal 
expenses. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15). Second, he claims 
that the lower court improperly awarded Plaintiff attorneys' fees 
in that the fees were unreasonable and that there was no showing 
that she needed assistance in paying them. (Appellant's Brief, 
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pp. 16-19)• These two assertions will now be discussed. 
A. The Lower Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
in Requiring Defendant to Pay Certain Expenses 
and Costs Incurred by Plaintiff in this 
Litigation. 
Defendant asserts that Utah law specifically prohibits the 
awarding of certain "costs" which are incurred by one party in 
preparation for litigation against another. Defendant relies upon 
this Court's decision of Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah 
App. 1988) as supporting the proposition that appraisal, 
accounting and incidental legal expenses are not "costs" within 
the meaning of Rule 54(d)(1). (Appellantfs Brief, p. 13). 
Plaintiff does not disagree with the decision in the Stevens 
case since the accounting fees and appraisal fees as well as other 
costs incurred by Plaintiff's attorneys would clearly not be 
allowed as "costs" under Rule 54. It will be noted that under 
Rule 54 a party who claims costs must file within five days after 
the entry of judgment a verified memorandum stating the costs 
which he is requesting. The opposing party dissatisfied with 
these costs may then request that a bill of costs be taxed by the 
court in which the judgment was rendered. A review of the record 
in this case shows that plaintiff made no attempt to file such a 
memorandum of costs as is required by Rule 54. 
Rather, the items now complained about by the defendant were 
introduced during the trial as evidence. Mr. Harold Christensen, 
attorney for Plaintiff, explained to the court why it was proper 
to allow the appraisal fee of Bud Ashley into evidence. He 
stated: 
Your Honor, I think that ordinarily, expert witness 
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fees are not recoverable as a cost of the action in the 
typical, personal injury suit, and that's true. Here, 
we are talking about a situation where a liability has 
been incurred. This is a debt, and much like the debts 
the doctor will be testifying that he owes. And its an 
obligation that will have to be paid by Mrs. Morgan in 
this case; and I think under the circumstances, it's 
part of the overall debts, and assets, and liabilities 
of the parties. The court is entitled to consider her 
liabilities to the same extent the court is entitled to 
look at his liabilities. 
THE COURT: I think Mr. Dolowitz is absolutely 
right, insofar as there being a provision by decision of 
our Supreme Court that expert witnesses, as far as 
chargeable costs are concerned, if you award costs 
against a party, the expert witness are paid only the 
ordinary fees. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I do agree. 
THE COURT: I also agree with you, Mr. Christensen, 
as far as she has incurred here substantially, and I 
don't know how that is, but for all kinds of things, but 
including the services of you two gentlemen, but I don't 
know how in the world I can make an adequate decision in 
this case without knowing exactly what both parties on 
both sides are facing, as far as their liabilities, as 
well as what their assets are. So, I'm going to allow 
the evidence in, not as a chargeable cost Mr. Dolowitz, 
only for the purpose of showing that it is an expense 
that has been incurred in this matter. (Tr. 107-108). 
The lower court in formulating its division of marital 
property in subdivision VII (i) through (n) listed both the 
plaintiff's legal, accounting and appraisal fees as well as the 
defendant's legal, accounting and appraisal fees. These fees were 
treated as a liability against the defendant which was then 
necessarily offset by an award of corresponding assets to the 
defendant since the total award to plaintiff and defendant are 
nearly identical. The court specifically found that these 
accounting and appraisal fees incurred by both parties were 
reasonable. (Finding No. 8; see Appellant's Exhibit D). As such, 
the court treated these obligations of both parties in the same 
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manner that it treated other liabilities- It did not treat these 
expenses as a "cost" in which no corresponding credit is given to 
a party who is found to have incurred such a cost. 
Section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code Annotated empowers a court to 
award such sums "as will permit the opposing party to bring or 
defend the action• The decision to make such an award, together 
with the amount thereof, rests primarily with the sound discretion 
of the trial court." Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 
1980) . 
The court correctly treated these various expenses as 
marriage debts incurred by both parties which had to be paid by 
someone. Even the defendant himself acknowledged that these fees 
were liabilities to himself and his wife and that "someone is 
going to have to pay them." (Tr. 435-437). 
A review of the division of marital property made by the 
court shows that the defendant received a majority of the liquid 
assets including some $314,000 worth of stocks. In addition, 
defendant had a net disposable income of $155,000, $189,000, and 
$164,000 for 1984, 1985, and 1986 respectively. Thus, with the 
award of nearly three-fourths of the stock together with the 
substantial income from the defendant's dental practice these fees 
and expenses could be paid by the defendant much more easily than 
by the plaintiff who had very little liquidity in comparison. 
As observed earlier, if the lower court incorrectly charged 
these particular expenses in the marital division then the matter 
should be remanded in order to allow the lower court to 
redistribute the assets and liabilities based upon the assumption 
-12-
that Plaintiff would then be solely responsible for these fees and 
would have to obtain additional assets from the defendant in order 
to satisfy such obligations. Essentially, therefore, the 
defendant is complaining at most about form over substance. These 
expenses must be paid by someone and must be paid out of the 
assets of the marriage. The lower court did not consider these 
expenses as "costs" but included them in the total liabilities of 
the parties. This approach was correct and logical and 
accomplishes the same purpose as requiring plaintiff to pay her 
own fees but also requiring defendant to give up more assets to 
the plaintiff in order to do so. Thus, as to the expenses 
preceding, the lower court decision was correcct. 
B. The Lower Court Was Correct in Determining 
That the Attorneys1 Fees Charged to Plaintiff 
Were Reasonable and, in any Event, Plaintiff 
Does Not Have Sufficient Liquid Assets to 
Incur this Obligation. 
Unlike the other expenses incurred in preparation of the 
divorce proceeding, Dr. Morgan does not contest the authority of 
the lower court to order him to pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees. 
He acknowledges that under Utah statutory authority and case law 
one party can be required to pay the other party's attorneys' 
fees. Instead, he contends that the fee was unreasonable and 
furthermore that he should not be required to pay it since Mrs. 
Morgan has sufficient assets to take care of the matter herself. 
Before proceeding, however, it should again be noted as was stated 
in the preceding section that the lower court treated both the 
attorneys' fees of defendant and the plaintiff as equal and 
assigned them both as a liability to the marriage. Under this 
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approach, the combined attorneys' fees were essentially paid for 
by both parties since assets were adjusted to liabilities. Under 
this technique it cannot be said that Defendant incurred as a 
separate obligation apart and aside from the divorce proceedings 
the attorneys' fees which is normally the case in most of the 
authorities relied upon by the defendant. 
Even if it is assumed arguendo, however, that attorneys' fees 
were awarded in the more traditional sense against Dr. Morgan with 
no offsetting asset given to him because of such award, it is 
clear that the court did not abuse its discretion. First, the 
attorneys' fees were definitely reasonable. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the test for reasonableness as follows: 
Reasonable attorneys' fees are not measured by what 
an attorney actually billed, nor is the number of hours 
spent on the case determinative in computing fees. In 
determining the reasonableness of attorneys' fees... [a] 
court may consider, among other factors, the difficulty 
of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of 
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in 
the locality for similar services, the amount involved 
in the case and the result attained, and the expertise 
and experience of the attorneys involved. Cabrera 
v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985). 
See also, Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984). 
In the instant case there was ample evidence showing that 
such fees were reasonable. Shaunna Wixom, a paralegal for 
plaintiff's attorney firm, testified as to her experience and her 
rate of $47.50 an hour. She also testified as to the 
extraordinary effort that was required in this case because of the 
failure of Dr. Morgan to cooperate with plaintiff's attorneys. 
She stated that at least 250 hours were spent working on the case 
and that in fact some of that time was probably written off. (Tr. 
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356-371). 
Mr. Harold Christensen, the chief attorney for the plaintiff, 
testified that his rate of service was reasonable in light of his 
experience and that the rates for the others involved in the case 
were also reasonable. (Tr. 372-374). Exhibit 62 contains the 
date and description of the services and persons who performed the 
service from the commencement of the employment to the time of 
trial. 
Mr. Christensen further testified that a higher fee was 
required on her behalf than that of defendant since in cases such 
as this the information concerning finances is peculiarly 
available to the professional husband whereas the home-maker wife 
has little knowledge as to the financial affairs of her spouse. 
In addition, the husband has a relationship with CPAs and other 
professionals which the wife does not. (Tr. 375-376). 
Mr. Christensen further stated that obtaining information 
from Dr. Morgan was, pardon the pun, like "pulling teeth." The 
plaintiff repeatedly requested information and would be given 
access to some but not all. It was necessary to take depositions 
of other third parties in order to verify that the information 
obtained was correct. (Tr. 376). 
Furthermore, Mr. Christensen stated that his firm attempts to 
use lower billing type of people in these kind of cases since both 
parties ultimately pay the costs. He stated that the weighted 
average billing rate of the various attorneys and paralegals 
involved in this case was $71.00 an hour. (Tr. 380). 
Upon cross examination he stated that his rate of $160 is not 
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uncommon in the community and that he was aware of several other 
attorneys charging this same rate. (Tr. 380-81). 
The defendant called no witnesses to contest the opinion of 
Ms. Wixom and Mr. Christensen that the fees charged were 
reasonable. In addition, he put on no witnesses to contest the 
claim that the evasion by Dr. Morgan required extraordinary effort 
and thereby incurred additional fees. As such, there was nothing 
in the record to contradict the testimony of Plaintiff as to the 
reasonableness of the fees. 
Next, Defendant complains that plaintiff is not in need of 
assistance in paying her attorneys' fees. In divorce cases, an 
award of attorneys' fees must be supported by evidence that it is 
reasonably needed by the party requesting the award. Huck v. 
Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986). Mrs. Morgan testified that she 
was requesting the court to award her attorneys' fees since she 
had no money to pay them. (Tr. 215). In addition, the evidence 
adduced at trial itself is a basis to show a wife's needs 
especially when monthly expenses are close to or exceeded by 
monthly income. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986); 
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985). 
As will be discussed in the alimony portion of this brief, 
Defendant repeatedly attempts throughout the brief to characterize 
the awards to Plaintiff as overly generous and giving her ample 
money to live on, secured assets, and essentially no problems 
while at the same time characterizing his award as one with little 
liquidity, speculative assets, and many problems. This 
characterization is simply untrue. 
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It is undisputed that Mrs. Morgan has no useful occupation. 
As a housewife and mother for some 39 years Mrs. Morgan acquired 
no skills which she could use to produce an income anywhere near 
the income she would require just to live comfortably. On the 
other hand, Dr. Morgan has a substantial income and obviously is 
able to utilize that income in prudent investments. Thus, Mrs. 
Morgan must obtain her monthly income from either the assets 
themselves or from alimony. 
The lower court observed in the initial minute entry that the 
court was "cognizant of the fact that the division of assets here 
awards to the plaintiff a substantial amount of money which should 
produce income for her." (Minute Entry, April 13, 1988. See 
Exhibit A of Appellant's Brief.). Thus, it is elementary that if 
Mrs. Morgan is to obtain a sufficient income to live each month 
she must maintain the integrity of her assets. She does not have 
the luxury of selling them and later replacing them with other 
income-producing property. 
The stock cannot be sold by Mrs. Morgan for the purpose of 
paying attorneys1 fees and other expenses. To do so would 
eliminate a valuable source of income for her continued comfort. 
Likewise, she is unable to liquidate the Bel-Aire Apartment 
Building in order to pay for these fees. Her award of alimony 
also goes to payingher monthly expenses. 
It is therefore apparent that should Mrs. Morgan have to 
suddenly pay some $75,000 in fees that the plan that the lower 
court devised would immediately be destroyed. 
Defendant laments that he was "awarded only one income 
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producing asset, his dental practice." (Appellant's Brief, p. 
19). This statement is simply not true nor, even if it were, 
would it justify Mrs. Morgan being required to pay these attorneys 
fees. In 1986 this "one asset" of the doctor's dental practice 
netted an income of $164,000. In addition, Defendant received a 
distribution from the Eckman-Midgley partnership of $43,000, 
$15,000, $6,000 and $30,000 for the years 1984, 1985, 1986, and 
1987 respectively. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 23, 52; Tr. 275-76). 
The partnership presently has a positive cash flow and has a 
tenant with a seven-year lease. (Tr. 277-79). 
An examination of Exhibit 52 shows that in 1986 Dr. Morgan 
had a disposable income of $223,433. While part of this includes 
the sale of stocks it also includes a debit for the Broadmoor 
Apartments which have now been sold by Dr. Morgan. Essentially, 
therefore, it is safe to assume that as long as Dr. Morgan 
continues his dental practice he has a disposable income of over 
$200,000 a year and certainly has the capacity to pay the fees 
that were incurred in this action on both sides. Conversely, Mrs. 
Morgan as mentioned earlier, is solely dependent upon the income 
producing assets and certainly has no way of making these 
expenditures. Thus, even if it is assumed that the traditional 
test for attorneys' fees must be employed rather than the method 
utilized by the court in treating such fees as a liability of the 
marriage, Mrs. Morgan would clearly be entitled to such an award. 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY VALUED THE 
BANK ACCOUNTS OF THE PARTIES. 
The defendant argues that the lower court incorrectly placed 
values on six bank accounts utilized by the parties in their 
various businesses. Defendant claims that the court incorrectly 
relied upon bank statements that were presented in evidence 
showing balances in these accounts anywhere from four weeks to two 
weeks prior to the trial. He asserts that the lower court should 
have believed his testimony that these accounts had negative 
balances in them and therefore the lower court erred in awarding 
him cash balances that did not exist. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
19-21) . 
The trial in this case was held on December 14 through 
December 17, 1987. At the beginning of the first day Plaintiff 
produced several exhibits during the testimony of Dr. Morgan as to 
the balances showing on these various checking accounts. He 
acknowledged that these were the most recent statements from the 
banks. (Tr. 29-33). All of the statements were admitted by the 
court. (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). 
Dr. Morgan maintained, however, that he had written checks 
on these accounts between the time of the statement and trial and 
that the balances were therefore considerably lower. These 
"calculations" of Dr. Morgan were unsubstantiated as to the checks 
written or the charges incurred. He simply gratuitously offered 
his opinion as to what the accounts had in them as of the time of 
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trial, (Tr. 29-33). He also gave this same information to his 
accountant who prepared it as part of Defendant's proposal for 
division of the assets. (Exhibit 79; Tr. 414-15). 
During the motion to amend the findings this same argument as 
now being made by Dr. Morgan was raised to the lower court. 
Plaintiff's counsel stated to the court: 
We put that evidence on and Dr. Morgan did not 
account for where the money went after it was drawn out 
of the accounted and what he's saying is it was used to 
pay operating bills. Well, if that's true, then he 
should have accounts for that and frankly, if he had 
done that, we would have brought in the tenants who 
would have said that their rent checks were held for two 
or three months, not put into the account, they weren't 
cashed, so, I mean, there are two sides to that. (Tr. 
of May 16, 1988 hearing, p. 9). 
The arguments now made by Defendant are fatally flawed. 
First, unlike the Berger case cited by Appellant, the evaluation 
in this case does not involve a year but only involves a maximum 
of four weeks prior to trial. As noted by Plaintiff's counsel 
there was no effort made to account for how this money was used. 
No backup documents were produced by Dr. Morgan. The mere summary 
offered by the accountant did not satisfy the evidentiary 
requirement of producing the primary evidence of the outstanding 
checks which had allegedly been paid. Harned v. Credit Bureau of 
Gillette, 513 P.2d 650 (Wyo. 1973). It would have required 
little effort for Dr. Morgan to obtain a more current bank record 
from the various banks involved had he elected to do so. In such 
a case, the bank statements would have been conclusive evidence of 
the balances left in the accounts and would also have been 
evidence as to how the money was spent. 
The conduct of Dr. Morgan throughout this litigation also 
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justified the lower court in relying upon a previous date of 
evaluation. This Court has held that a trial court in dividing 
marital property may value property at a time earlier than the 
divorce decree if one party dissipates assets, hides its values, 
or otherwise acts obstructively* Teck v. Teck, 738 P.2d 1050 
(Utah App. 1987). In addition, choice of time for valuation is 
within the broad discretion of the district court. In Re 
Marriage of Krause, 614 P.2d 525, 527 (Mont. 1980). 
Finally, this argument again is form over substance. If Dr. 
Morgan in fact paid obligations out of these accounts then those 
obligations were not left to be paid and divided by the court. 
Whether he had cash in hand with an outstanding obligation or 
whether he had no cash with obligations paid results in the same 
effect. 
Thus, the court did not err in evaluating these bank accounts 
based upon the best evidence available. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING 
ALIMONY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
This Court has stated that it will not disturb the trial 
court's award of spousal support absent a showing of a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331 (Utah App. 1988); Passel v. Passel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 
1986) . 
An alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize the 
party's respective post-divorce living standards and maintain them 
at a level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 
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(Utah 1988); Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988). 
The Utah Supreme Court articulated three factors that must be 
considered by the trial court in determining a reasonable alimony 
award: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the requesting 
spouse; (2) the ability of the requesting spouse to produce a 
sufficient income for himself or herself; and (3) the ability of 
the other spouse to provide support. Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 
564, 566 (Utah 1985); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). 
Applying the above standards to this case shows that the 
lower court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to 
the plaintiff. First, it is undisputed that the parties were 
married in 1950, that Mrs. Morgan bore five children, and raised 
them in the family residence until they all became adults. She 
worked in a publishing company and hospital while her husband was 
going to dental school and after he graduated she did not do any 
further income-producing work. (Tr. 183-85). Exhibit 52 
(attached to Exhibit L of Appellant's Brief) shows that on the 
other hand Dr. Morgan averaged approximately $200,000 of 
disposable income from 1984 through 1986. His dental practice 
alone produced on the average of $170,000 as disposable income a 
year. While Dr. Morgan stated that his health was not as good as 
it had been and that he would like to retire some day, there is no 
substantial evidence that this income will be terminated in the 
immediate future. (Tr. 451-52). 
Examining the expense end of the spectrum shows the 
following. Exhibit 54 (attached to Exhibit J of Appellant's 
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Brief) was an estimate by Vera Morgan that she required $5,500 in 
order to maintain her present standard of living- However, this 
schedule was assuming that she maintained her residence at the 
family home on Marilyn Drive. (Tr. 191). In addition, it did 
not assume that the court would order that she be obligated to pay 
one-half of the over $4,000 monthly mortgage existing on the 
Marilyn residence. [Tr. 232; Decree of Divorce, para. 2(d)]. 
In addition, plaintiff was not anticipating that she would also be 
responsible for an estimated $28,000 in debts incurred when and if 
the Marilyn property was sold since the underlying mortgages on 
the property exceeded the appraised value of the property by some 
$56,000. See, Court Division of Marital Property IIIA. Thus, 
Mrs. Morgan's expenses with the addition of the mortgage payment 
and the requirement of renting a new residence easily exceeds 
$8,000 a month. 
Even assuming that under today's rental market the Bel-Aire 
is capable of still generating $4,000 net a month—which in all 
probability it is not, (See testimony of David VanDrimmelen 
concerning the Salt Lake real estate market, Tr. 340-45), this 
supposed $4,000 plus the $2,000 in alimony is still short of 
plaintiff's needs even assuming a return of 10% upon the other 
stock assets that plaintiff has been awarded. Without the $2,000 
alimony payment Plaintiff would be completely incapable of meeting 
her obligations. 
On the flip side of the coin, Dr. Morgan, while he may have 
initial expenses because of the divorce, can easily satisfy these 
expenses out of his income, by obtaining short term loans or by 
selling some of his liquid assets which were specifically awarded 
to him to enable him to initially recover from these court 
expenses. Such an award allowing an adjustment to pay expenses is 
proper. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). Since 
the major drain on Dr. Morgan's cash flow was the Broadmoor 
Apartments which have now been sold, Dr. Morgan cannot complain 
that his income is insufficient to meet his current obligations as 
well as to assist his wife during this transition period. 
In summary, the court properly evaluated the factors 
necessary in determining alimony in this case and the record is 
patently clear as to her need and his ability to pay. Passel 
v. Passel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986). 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER ALLEGED TAX CONSEQUENCES AS A 
RESULT OF THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY. 
Defendant contends that the lower court erred in failing to 
consider the tax consequences which would occur because of the 
various awards made by the court. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
26-28). First, he contends that the court erred in failing to 
consider the existing tax debt caused by the sale of the PSI Ltd. 
interest totaling some $30,000. He contends that not only did the 
court erroneously award plaintiff $15,329 but also failed to 
consider the tax consequences of that sale. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 27) . 
The court correctly awarded Plaintiff one-half of the 
proceeds from that sale since he unilaterally, without permission 
of the plaintiff, applied the entire proceeds to the Capital City 
-24-
Bank line of credit which is written on his dental practice. The 
entire proceeds of the sale went to reduce a line of credit which 
can fluctuate from day to day and which is used by the defendant 
in his medical practice. Certainly, Plaintiff was entitled to half 
of the proceeds of this sale regardless of how the money was spent 
by defendant. 
As to any tax liability on that sale it should be noted that 
the parties filed a joint return for 1987 and therefore it can be 
assumed that plaintiff and defendant shared equally in the tax 
consequences of that sale. In addition, since no return was due 
at the time of trial it is unknown whether the sale had any effect 
upon the actual return of the parties in light of other offsetting 
taxable events. In effect, therefore, the tax liability picture 
was not clear at the time of trial and certainly would have been 
speculative as to its effect. 
In this same line, Dr. Morgan further contends that he should 
have been given a tax credit for having to liquidate his assets in 
order to pay the existing obligations. He contends that the lower 
court erred in not applying a credit to him because of the tax 
consquences which would be incurred as a result of selling these 
assets. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 27-28). 
Again, such an argument is specious since there is no 
substantial evidence to show that Dr. Morgan must sell any stock 
in order to pay these debts. The income of Dr. Morgan together 
with his ability to borrow money could easily take care of these 
obligations especially on a time-deferred basis which he in all 
probability can arrange with many of the creditors. 
It is fundamental that a decision to consider tax 
consequences in evaluating assets in a marriage dissolution must 
be based entirely on the totality of circumstances and such 
decision rests in the trial court's sound discretion. In Re 
Marriage of Grubb, 721 P.2d 1194 (Colo. App. 1986). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that a trial court should 
not speculate about hypothetical consequences of taxable events. 
Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utah 1987). . Tax 
consequences should not be considered when such alleged 
consequences are in the future and are based upon hypothetical 
situations. In Re Marriage of Bayer, 687 P.2d 537 (Colo. App. 
1984); In Re marriage of Marx, 159 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Cal. App. 
1979). 
The lower court was not required to accept the speculative 
testimony as to tax liabilities for events which may or may not 
happen at a time when tax consequences could not be known. The 
court correctly evaluated the division at the time especially in 
light of Dr. Morgan's substantial income and ability to handle his 
financial affairs in a prudent manner. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO APPLY A MINORITY DISCOUNT TO THE 
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST OF DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that in certain cases a minority 
discount should be applied in evaluating the assets of a divorce. 
A minority discount is a reduction in the value of the stock of a 
party who has a minority interest in a closely held corporation on 
the theory that the party lacks the voting power to control 
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decisions. See generally R. Longnecker,A Practical Guide to 
Evaluations of Closely Held Stock, 122 Trusts and Estates 32, 38 
(Jan. 1983). Furthermore, a district court need not discount the 
stock in a closed corporation in all instances. In Re the 
Marriage of Johnson, 716 P.2d 322 (Mont. 1986). 
It should also be observed that valuation of a closed 
corproation is discretionary and will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it is contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance 
of the evidence. In Re Marriage of Popp, 1988 Wise. App. 
LEXIS 909 (No. 87-0830, Oct. 12, 1988, Wise. App.). Finally, a 
trial court in a divorce action is not required to accept any one 
method of stock valuation as more accurate than another accounting 
procedure. Dean v. Dean, 275 N.W.2d 902 (Wise. 1979). 
It should be noted that the two main partnership interests in 
this case are not closely held corporations but are in fact equal 
partnerships. Dr. Morgan owned a 25% interest along with three 
other investors in both the Eckman-Midgley and Associates 
partnership and in the Sunvest Ltd. partnership. See Court 
Division of Marital Property V. Thus, this is not an instance 
where one person is at a distinct disadvantage over the others 
since each person had a 25% say in the on-going operation. 
Second, both the witneses and the underlying documents of the 
principal partnerships, require an evaluation of the underlying 
property as the means of determining the value of the partners' 
interests. Mr. Jay Midgley, one of the four partners in the 
Midgley and Sunvest partnerships testified that the value of the 
partnership interest is essentially the value of the real estate 
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less the debt on the real estate. (Tr. 267). 
Article XI of the Eckman-Midgley partnership (Exhibit 17) and 
Articles X and XI of the Sunvest partnership (Exhibit 30) provide 
that "the value of the interest of a deceased or withdrawing 
partner shall be determined by appraisal of the partnership 
property. . . ." 
Mel Norman, defendant's CPA witness, while advocating that a 
minority discount of 35% be applied in this case conceded that a 
minority interest would not be appropriate in terms of the way 
this agreement was written. In a dialogue with the court the 
following occurred: 
THE COURT: And it [the value of the partnership 
being higher than a minority discount] would also be 
true, or a similar scenario would be true if in relation 
to any of the minority interest, there is a provision 
for buyout at full interest and no discount by reason of 
the partnership agreement or the limited partnership 
agreement? 
THE WITNESS: Well, let's see if I am understanding 
that. If the partnership agreement between the parties 
themselves, now the partner? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
THE WITNESS: If, at the option of the party being 
bought out, the seller, the others automatically have to 
buy them out, I would say that's true. (Tr. 517-18). 
Also, the minority discount theory assumes that a sale will 
be imminent because of the divorce decree. There was no evidence 
produced by defendant that such a sale would be required because 
of an award by the court and in fact, from all existing evidence, 
it appears that the partnerships will continue for many years. 
Under the circumstances of this case the lower court was not 
obligated to apply a minority discount to the various partnership 
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interests of the defendant. To do so would have given defendant 
an artificially created advantage at the disadvantage of 
plaintiff• The evalution was therefore correct. 
CONCLUSION 
There are no winners in a case such as this. A family unit 
which has for three decades existed is now destroyed—each party 
must now make the necessary adjustments to continue a productive 
life. Likewise, there are no hard and fast rules as to how this 
substantial marital estate should be divided. The law leaves such 
decisions to the wisdom of the trial judge provided he does not 
abuse his discretionay power. 
Here, the lower court very carefully divided the assets and 
liabilities in such a manner as to give both parties the 
opportunity to rebuild their lives. Mrs. Morgan is left with 
sufficient income generating assets to provide a comfortable life 
style. Her liabilities are proportional to her ability to pay. 
Dr. Morgan is left with substantial assets as well as the 
potential of his dental practice and other proven business 
ventures. While his liabilites are greater, they too are 
proportional to his income producing ability. 
Neither party received everything they thought they 
deserved. However, the law does not guarantee complete 
satisfaction in cases such as this—only substantial equity. 
Neither party can justly complain that they were treated unfairly 
in light of the circumstances. 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-29-
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
and 
i .Zytfid^ 
Craig S, Cofok 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to David S. Dolowitz and 
Julie A. Bryan, COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, 525 East 100 South, 
Fifth Floor, P. 0. Box 11008, Salt lake City, Utah 84147-0008 this 
31st day of January, 1989, 
XM^LLL £ jL&>i ^ 
-30-
